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One of the features of the political environment of modern Russia is the absence 
of a real separation of powers. Over the past twenty years, the national government has 
completely subordinated the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. This goal was 
achieved through the construction of a vertical of power. As a result, the rights of the 
president and his administration increased, the regions submitted to the Kremlin, and the 
hegemony of the pro-presidential ruling party in the national and local parliaments was 
established. 
In the early 2000s, Russian regions were independent of the Kremlin; they 
controlled the regional budget, pursued their policies, and traded. To build a vertical of 
power for the national government, it was essential to repair local parliaments by 
introducing the party in power. For this, both violent and illegal methods were used, such 
as falsifying elections or eliminating political competitors, and more formal ones, for 
example, changing articles of the Constitution and laws of Russia. From 2003 to 2018, 
there were more than 200 changes to electoral rules in Russian regions, which ensured 
the victory of the ruling United Russia party. Since the regions differ from each other in 
social, political, and economic parameters, the changes in the conduct of elections and 
the reasons for these changes are different. 
In this paper, I attempted to identify the factors of the transformation of electoral 
systems in Russian regions. Using the theory of rational choice institutionalism as a 
theoretical framework and logistic regression as a research method, I found out that 
United Russia and the governors were the leading players who influenced the changes in 
electoral systems in the regions. It was also possible to find out how political actors 
influenced the transformation of the components of electoral systems, such as the size of 
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Thirty years of experience in holding democratic elections in Russia during the 
formation of a new political structure of society opens a new stage in the development of 
statehood. This makes the analysis of a wide range of problems inherent in elections as 
an independent political institution among the most urgent tasks of Russian science. 
Electoral process in the Russian regions is characterized by many researchers as 
non-linear and inconsistent, which is reflected in the specifics of the functioning of 
political institutions. In this regard, it is necessary to understand and assess the nature of 
the dynamics of the Russian political system, to identify the factors and trends in the 
formation and transformation of the institution of elections. 
The regional aspect of the changes in the political system that have taken place in 
Russia since the early 1990s testifies to a specific evolution that the Russian political 
system has made. The formation of a system of separation of powers is traced, when in 
every region administrations were formed, as well as local parliaments were elected, and 
somewhere even constitutional courts were established. At the same time, the dynamics 
of Russian federalism, as it was already possible to find out, did not have a vector 
character and did not differ in consistency and stability. Nevertheless, the economic base 
of the Russian territories changed, and the general principles of the organization of power 
in the subjects of the Federation changed. Elections to regional legislative assemblies 
have undergone significant changes. 
The evolution of federalism in Russia is a period of intense changes, the formation 
of new institutions, the emergence and further development of elements within the 
system. The institution of regional and local elections is no exception. However, they are 
distinguished by a significant distinctiveness compared to elections to federal bodies of 
state power because each element of the regional and municipal electoral process, starting 
with the legal status of voters and candidates for elective office and ending with voting 
procedures, has its own specifics, sometimes quite pronounced. 
The study of the functioning effects of political institutions in democracies is a 
developed research direction in political science. There are a lot of studies including how 
institutions influence the representation of interest groups and ethnic minorities (Minta 
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2013; Fessha 2009) which structure of institutions facilitates decision-making (Bonvecchi 
et al 2017); how institutions support accountability and turnover mechanisms (Rubenstein 
2007). 
However, there are still gaps concerning the understanding of the role of certain 
formally democratic institutions under authoritarian rule in political science. One of them 
is the electoral system (Gandhi and Heller 2018). In some authoritarian regimes (such as 
competitive or electoral authoritarianism), democratic electoral institutions (regular 
elections, political parties, electoral systems) are controlled by authoritarian incumbents. 
They mix these institutions with undemocratic practices (manipulations at various stages 
of the electoral process or electoral manipulations), guaranteeing the current government 
victory in elections (Schedler 2006). There are several types of electoral manipulation. 
Firstly, it is the manipulation of electoral institutions, including electoral systems, when 
the rules for elections favor certain political actors, while others lose (Ibid). The second 
type includes the manipulation of voters' preferences and the possibilities of political 
choice. This type of manipulation, like the first, is usually implemented in anticipation of 
elections and is associated with influencing voters, parties, and candidates. Examples are 
censorship in the media, coercion of voters to a specific type of electoral behavior, 
depriving opposition parties and candidates of the opportunity to participate in elections 
(Fortin-Rittberger 2014: 100). Finally, the third type is the manipulation of the voting 
process and the counting of votes, for example, the exclusion of certain voters from the 
lists of voters, disruption of the work of the voting premises, falsification of election 
results (Ibid). This is understandably the reason for the electoral manipulations or who 
benefits from these manipulations. But it is more significant to understand when and 
under what conditions incumbents and authoritarian leaders use these undemocratic 
instruments to win in elections.  
The case of Russia as an example of an authoritarian state with formal democratic 
institutions could help answer this question. In the early 2000s, the presidential 
administration launched reforms to strengthen power (the vertical of power). One of them 
is a change in the electoral systems in Russian regions. According to the federal law “On 
the Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in the Referendum 
of Citizens of the Russian Federation” adopted in 2002, from 2003, all regions of Russia 
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had to elect at least half of the deputies of the legislative assemblies by proportional 
electoral (Federal Law 67 2002). As a result, different elements of the electoral systems 
were changed as a method of transferring votes to seats, the threshold percentage, the 
proportion of deputies elected by proportional formula, and the number of 
parliamentarians. Moreover, in 2018 the number of changes in these parameters of 
regional electoral systems has reached two hundred. 
The transition of Russian regions to new electoral systems coincided with the 
consolidation of the electoral authoritarian regime at the state level (Golosov 2011). At 
the same time, there are numerous differences between the regions concerning 
demographic, socio-economic, and political parameters. And in some regions, there were 
significant changes that could help the ruling party to win in the elections and keep the 
legitimacy. In contrast, in other regions, the reforms of the electoral system were not 
significant. The research question of MA dissertation is what factors influence the 
change in the regional electoral systems in Russia. 
In this research, I will try to study what changes in the electoral systems of Russian 
regions took place from 2003 to 2018, the reasons for this, and what happened as a result 
of electoral transformations. Elections in an authoritarian regime are not instruments for 
the change of power but perform the functions of legitimizing the status quo, controlling 
political elites, and suppressing opposition (Gandhi 2009). Consequently, the focus of the 
master's thesis will be on the features of the electoral process in the Russian regions, their 
differences, and the prospects for the development of electoral systems in conditions of 
electoral authoritarianism.  
Using the theory of rational choice institutionalism and the Vertical of power, I 
identified the key political actors who could take part in making decisions in changing 
the electoral processes, namely the national government, governors, and the presidential 
United Russia. All three players had one common goal of maintaining and strengthening 
power. It is assumed that the interests in changing the electoral system of the regions were 
beneficial for critical players at different times. For example, it is expected that at the 
beginning of the electoral reforms, the national government and United Russia were 
involved in the transformation of electoral reforms most of all, since at this time, firstly, 
the beginning of the 2000s is the beginning of building the Power Vertical. The task was 
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set to implement United Russia into the political environment of the regions and the 
country, both institutionally and informally. Second, the governors of the Russian 
provinces were not loyal to the national government, and there was no reason to mobilize 
them to transform the electoral systems of the regions. 
In this paper I took the period from 2003 to 2018, when electoral reforms and 
elections were carried out in Russian regions. This period was divided into three cycles: 
2003-2007; 2008-2013; 2014-2018. Using the logistic regression method, I determined 
which components of electoral engineering (changes in the electoral system) were 
transformed in the regions in different electoral cycles, what were the reasons for this, 
who of the political actors influenced these changes. 
The structure of the thesis is the following. The first chapter will focus on theories 
and scientific literature on the political effects of electoral systems and the reasons for 
electoral reforms. This section includes a literature review, the main approaches to 
changing electoral systems, the reasons for these transformations, and how political actors 
behave under authoritarian regimes. The political environment of modern Russia is also 
described in detail; the main economic, political, and legal changes in the 21st century 
are presented in the first chapter. The second chapter will provide the methodology and 
research design. Dependent and independent variables are identified, main hypotheses are 
presented, and research methods and sources are described. In the last part of the research, 
the results of the regression analysis, its interpretation, and the main conclusions on the 






Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
More than three decades ago, Arend Lijphart said the “study of electoral systems 
is undoubtedly the most underdeveloped subject in political science” (Lijphart, 1985). Of 
course, three decades is not an era, but specific trends in the development of science on a 
similar scale are pretty distinguishable. 
First, the volume of electoral data has increased. At the same time, the access of 
research community to their processing has become more accessible due to the 
development of computer technologies. This has led to an increase in the number of works 
devoted to analyzing various aspects of electoral systems. Second, along with the rise in 
the number of studies, the quality of scientific products has improved. In addition to 
descriptive works, analytical ones appeared, built on formal modeling in game theory, as 
well as statistical analysis of a large amount of empirical data (Grofman, 2016).  
Bernard Grofman considers that the study of electoral systems has become a 
central research area within comparative political science (Ibid). The essential component 
of such dynamics was the emergence of new directions in electoral research. One of these 
areas is the study of the reasons for electoral reforms. If a change in individual parameters 
of electoral systems can lead to fundamentally different political outcomes, then 
clarification of the circumstances of electoral engineering is extremely important for 
understanding the sources of stability of political systems. According to Shugart, the 
study of the reasons for the transformation of electoral systems is a new benchmark for 
electoral research in the XXI century (Shugart, 2005: 50-52). 
Analyzing electoral reforms in a cross-national context requires a more complex 
theoretical framework and more sophisticated quantification than studying the effects of 
electoral institutions. Second, there are relatively few cases of electoral reforms when 
compared with the ever-increasing volume of electoral statistics resulting from the 
elections (Ibid). 
In this section, theoretical approaches to understanding the causes of electoral 
reforms are analyzed, and promising vectors of scientific research in the field of studying 
electoral systems as dependent variables are outlined. 
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1.1. Main approaches to changing electoral systems 
 
Sartori was one of the first who said that the electoral system is “the most 
manipulated instrument of politics” (Sartori 1968). However, research interest has begun 
recently in comparative politics. In particular, the number of works has increased, where 
the question was asked about the factors of transformation of electoral systems in various 
countries. According to Norris, the reason for the growing research interest in electoral 
systems as "dependent variables" was the fact that in the 1990s, the issue of electoral 
reform became the focus of the agenda for Italy, New Zealand, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Israel (Norris, 1995). 
According to Benoit, various options explanations of the processes of the 
emergence or change of electoral systems can be attributed to three categories, depending 
on what kind of agents were at the origins of electoral transformations: political actors 
(their personal interests) or non-personalized social, economic or historical circumstances 
(Benoit, 2004). 
Electoral systems changes may be based on also the motives of political actors. 
Although according to Sartori, electoral engineering can influence the voter and change 
his behavior, it has consistently been recognized by politicians (Sartori, 1968: 273). As 
Quintal said, since electoral systems have a direct impact on the distribution of power, 
and politicians are directly related to this process, the choice of electoral legislation will 
necessarily be carried out during the negotiation process (Quintal, 1970: 752). This 
position was also taken by Nohlen, who noted that electoral systems are established as a 
result of negotiations between opposing political forces (Nohlen, 1984: 221-223). 
Among the motives that politicians could be guided by regarding the rules of 
electoral competition, there may be a desire to realize common interests. In such 
situations, decision-making agents pursue goals such as ensuring fair representation of 
social groups, creating conditions for the formation of a responsible and effective 
government following elections, and designing a system, checks and balances, for 
example, against the excessive concentration of power in the hands of one political force, 
etc. Thus, the principle of fair representation of social groups corresponds instead to a 
proportional electoral system, while the principles of efficiency and responsibility of the 
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government and, consequently, more excellent controllability, the creation of conditions 
for the formation of a responsible and effective government following elections, the 
construction of a system of checks and balances, for example, against the excessive 
concentration of power in the hands of one political strength, etc. (Horowitz, 2003).  
Another focus on understanding electoral reforms provides an approach based on 
the fact that political actors prefer electoral systems that closely correspond to their 
private interests. The latter can consist either in the desire to implement a policy-seeking 
or to obtain an office-seeking. The essence of the differences between these perspectives 
is as follows. First, being guided by the desire to achieve office-seeking, political actors 
do not take into account considerations related to creating conditions for the formation of 
post-election solid coalitions, which would be the basis for the implementation of policy-
seeking (Benoit 2004).  
1.2. Reasons for changes in electoral systems: rational choice 
approach 
 
Most of the scholarly papers that looked at electoral reforms from a comparative 
perspective were written according to rational choice theories. As a result, political parties 
change the parameters of electoral systems to maximize their representation in 
legislatures or minimize the costs associated with electoral challenges. 
One of the first who drew attention to the fact that electoral systems can be formed 
under the pressure of the rational considerations of political actors was John Grumm. In 
the article “Theories of electoral systems”, analyzing the examples of Belgium, Denmark, 
Norway, Switzerland, and Germany, he formulated a hypothesis: a proportional electoral 
system is established where a large number of parties already exist, while plurality or 
majority formulas, associated with high uncertainty about the winners, will be less 
attractive to parties in a highly competitive environment (Grumm, 1958: 376).  
David Quintal believed that political parties are rational actors seeking to increase 
their representation in power (Quintal, 1970). According to the researcher, the more 
successful and influential a party is in elections, the more likely it is to choose 
disproportionate electoral systems. 
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Stein Rokkan, relying on the rationalistic paradigm, proposed a theory explaining 
the reasons for electoral reforms and the widespread use of proportional representation in 
Europe in the 19th – 20th centuries. According to him, before the First World War, the 
proportional system was primarily in ethnically heterogeneous states and served to 
represent minorities. However, after 1918, the requirements for adopting the proportional 
electoral system were associated with other reasons. Firstly, the growth of the influence 
of socialist parties due to the expansion of suffrage, and secondly, the attempts of the old 
parties to maintain their position due to the electoral mobilization of the working class 
(Rokkan, 1970).  
After Rokkan, Carles Boix tried to answer why in the late XIX - early XX century, 
many Western democracies have moved to proportional representation. Based on 
statistical analysis, Boix concluded that electoral systems are changed by the ruling 
parties seeking to maximize their representation. As long as the electoral competition 
does not change and the current electoral regime is favorable to the ruling parties, the 
electoral system remains unchanged. However, when the conditions for electoral 
competition undergo changes (due to the emergence of new groups of voters or a change 
in the preferences of citizens), the ruling parties can modify the electoral system. When 
the new parties are strong, and the old ones are not, the latter change the electoral system 
from plural to proportional, but they do not do this if they are able to coordinate around 
any one player. When new parties are weak, the system of disproportionate representation 
persists regardless of the structure of the old party system. Also, Boix concluded that a 
high degree of ethnic and religious fragmentation, under certain conditions, encourages 
the adaptation of the proportional electoral system (Boix, 1999: 608-612).  
Kenneth Benoit proposed a model for changing electoral systems based on the 
rational behavior of political actors (parties). The theory developed by him establishes 
that electoral reforms take place in the process of choosing by political parties such rules 
of the game that are most consistent with their desire to maximize their parliamentary 
representation. Parties rank institutional alternatives in descending order in terms of how 
many seats they can count on. Each party seeks to obtain information that makes it 
possible to estimate the share of votes that it will receive from each alternative. This 
information includes both expectations of electoral support and expectations of the effect 
of institutional rules. Changes in electoral institutions will occur when a political party or 
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coalition of parties supports an alternative that will bring them more seats than the current 
electoral system—but provided that they have enough power to enforce the option. 
Electoral systems do not change when neither the party nor the coalition of parties has 
the necessary resources to adapt an alternative electoral system or when electoral reform 
is not perceived as an opportunity to gain additional parliamentary seats (Benoit, 2004). 
Bowler, Donovan, and Karp, having studied the attitudes of politicians in 
Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand regarding changing their electoral 
systems, draw to the conclusion that, first of all, they are driven by a private interest 
associated with ensuring opportunities for their election or re-election. The winning 
parties strive not so much to maximize representation in the future but to maintain their 
positions. Thus, they are focused primarily on minimizing the costs associated with the 
risk of not being re-elected for a new term. The most attractive strategy for reducing risks 
for political parties in a democracy is maintaining the status quo. Since the rules for 
holding democratic elections are usually non-discriminatory and allow the defeat of the 
ruling party (or coalition of parties), the new government does not have incentives for 
institutional changes, since it was thanks to the existing rules that it was elected (Bowler, 
Donovan and Karp 2006). 
1.3. Researching electoral reforms 
 
Recently, the rational choice approach to understanding the reasons for electoral 
reforms has come under criticism. For example, Norris considers this model to be 
ineffective because the only agents of electoral changes are political parties, and their 
only motive is to maximize representation. As a research tool for understanding the 
reasons for electoral reforms, Norris proposed a policy cycle model, which has an 
advantage over a rational approach in that it identifies a wide range of actors interested in 
transformations. It presupposes a stepwise process of political adoption solutions (Norris, 
2011). 
In this model, the decision-making process is considered as a sequence of stages. 
The first is the definition of the agenda. At this stage, the need for electoral reform is 
articulated. The main actors are civil society institutions (parties, media, NGOs). The 
second stage is decision-making. Alternatives are put forward on it, and political 
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coalitions are formed around them. The main actors are parliamentary parties and the 
executive branch. In the third stage, the decision is implemented. Finally, in the fourth 
stage, the feedback function is executed. Moreover, all decision-making phases take place 
in an environment that imposes historical, social, cultural, and economic constraints on 
this process (Ibid).  
Focusing her attention on the first stage of the political decision-making cycle 
(setting the agenda), Norris, based on cross-national analysis, concluded that the main 
factor in changing electoral systems is the lack of legitimacy of political institutions. 
Citizens' dissatisfaction with the way democratic institutions function contributes to the 
emergence of the issue of electoral reform on the agenda, which is discussed in detail by 
the actors who make specific political decisions (ibid: 546). 
As noted by Leyenaar and Hazan, in addition to the rational choice approach, the 
reasons for electoral reforms can also be studied from the point of view of behaviorism 
or institutionalism. For example, in the behavioral approach, the focus of research 
attention is not only parties, understood as unified political actors, but also their individual 
constituents; and the emphasis is not on their rationality but their values and ideologies. 
In turn, the main focus of the institutional approach is on the extent to which the 
institutional context encourages or inhibits electoral change. Thus, the authors' main 
conclusion is a better understanding of the reasons for electoral reforms provides a 
synthesis of all three approaches: rational, behavioral, and institutional (Leyenaar and 
Hazan 2011). 
All the approaches to the analysis of electoral reforms described so far have been 
developed based on empirical material from democratic countries. At the same time, the 
logic of electoral engineering in regimes of electoral authoritarianism also deserves 
attention since its disclosure is of interest from the point of view of deepening our 
knowledge of the internal dynamics of such political regimes.  
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1.4. The concepts of electoral reforms in electoral 
authoritarianism 
 
Studies of electoral reforms in countries of electoral authoritarianism can be 
divided into two groups. The first group includes studies of democratic transition, 
focusing interest on searching for the reasons leading to the formation of democracies in 
developing countries. The authors of this trend associate the behavior of elites in the 
process of democratization with dependence on factors of historical development, 
including the destruction of colonial rule and the formation of authoritarian regimes 
(Mozaffar et al. 2005).  
The incompleteness of nation-building or a general crisis of the social system 
necessitates stabilizing the political system. Therefore electoral reforms are aimed at 
consolidating political regime. Among the factors accelerating democratization are also 
mentioned economic crises, mass protests, the death of a dictator, and a split within the 
ruling party or group (Geddes 1999). 
It is believed that in Eastern Europe, democratization took place as a result of mass 
protests, and in Latin America, due to the split of the ruling groups. There are also 
alternative explanations indicating the role of the mistakes of the ruling elites. In reality, 
however, authoritarian regimes are usually poorly informed about the needs of society, 
and that is why they allow the creation of democratic institutions. These regimes are 
unable to predict the results of reforms, and therefore democratization is taking place 
against the will of the elites (Hale et al. 2017). 
Research in this field most often operates with qualitative data that emphasize the 
features of each specific case. For example, the authors talk about the inextricable link 
between electoral reforms and reforms of the political system. In addition, this group of 
researchers more often proceeds from the assumption that democratic institutions, 
including elections, are capable of promoting democratization even despite the will of the 
ruling group due to a lack of awareness of the needs of society. At the same time, in this 
approach, it is customary to proceed from the fact that the movement towards democracy 
arises primarily due to the conscious choice of the ruling group. 
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The second group of researchers sees the reasons for electoral reforms in the desire 
of the elites to ensure the desired result in the elections. This thesis fits into Lijphart's 
agenda for developed democracies. Using the institutions characteristic of democracy, 
ruling groups change electoral legislation in order to maintain power, including through 
the formation of a party system with a dominant party. Such systems allow autocracies to 
exist long enough without seriously democratizing political life. 
In carrying out electoral reforms, the ruling group often resorts to the distribution 
of economic transfers and rent in order to co-opt potential rivals. As a result, it splits up 
the opposition and increases coordination costs for it, creates opportunities for more 
active attraction of loyal voters to polling stations. At the same time, reforms are more 
likely to be carried out if the elites are confident in their ability to retain power (Golosov 
2013). 
The authors of this direction are characterized by attention to the influence of 
changes in the electoral legislation on political processes. They use quantitative methods 
much more often, focusing on rational choice theory and various varieties of the neo-
institutional approach. These researchers usually proceed from the assumption that 
electoral reforms do not necessarily lead to democratization, since the ruling group is able 
to predict well the results of its actions and create substitute institutions designed to serve 
as a kind of brake on democratization. Often such substituents become competitors of 
political parties and successfully oust them from the "electoral market" (Hale 2005). 
Electoral reforms in developed democracies are usually viewed as electoral 
engineering that does not impede the free expression of citizens' will. Arend Lijphart 
describes such reforms as changing the “rules of the game” to improve them and not affect 
their election results (Lijphart, 1994: 139). Noting the high internal homogeneity of 
electoral systems in developed democracies, he argues that their modifications do not 
affect the disproportionality of the party system or the effective number of parties. 
Therefore, it can be said that in developed democracies, electoral systems are not subject 
to change, and their changes do not distort election results (Ibid: 94). 
Researchers of electoral reforms in a democratic transition (Schedler, 2010: 69) 
traditionally refer to Russia as a country of the "gray zone", to be more specific, Russia 
is a state experiencing a recession of democratic institutions or making the first attempts 
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to build democracy. In these states, there are institutions characteristic of a democracy, 
including elections, but the results of elections do not meet the requirements of 
democracies (Schedler, 2002: 37). States are often referred to as hybrid regimes or 
countries of electoral authoritarianism. Other definitions can be found: competitive 
authoritarianism, dysfunctional democracies, electoral democracy (Levitsky et al. 2002).  
These states are characterized by a high degree of volatility in electoral and party 
systems. In the 1990s and 2000s, such states experienced either stagnation or recession 
of democratic institutions. Regular elections did not lead to democratization (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter, 1986). Nevertheless, the electoral reform agenda formulated by Lijphart 
is used in relation to them.  
Electoral authoritarianism includes democratic electoral institutions such as 
regular elections, political parties, electoral systems. However, one of the peculiarities is 
that their actual functions are not performed; this is a screen for authoritarian politicians. 
They can manipulate at different stages of the electoral process and resort to undemocratic 
practices. The ability to ignore democratic principles gives them a head start in the 
electoral process (Dahl, 1971: 6-10). 
This feature is the key reason it does not allow the regimes of this type to be 
classified as either electoral or liberal democracies. And the formality in the preservation 
of electoral procedures distinguishes them from classical autocracies (Schedler, 2002). 
For this study, it is necessary to study the papers devoted to electoral manipulation 
(widespread in the regimes of electoral authoritarianism) and, in particular, the logic of 
electoral engineering in non-democratic political regimes. 
Based on the literature, we can distinguish two approaches to what should be 
understood by electoral manipulation: formal and substantive campaigns. According to 
the formal approach, electoral manipulations are understood as illegal actions aimed at 
electoral fraud. Based on this understanding, Lehoucq described historical examples of 
electoral manipulations in North America, South America, Asia, and Europe: from fraud 
voting results and buying votes before manipulating voter lists. However, the problem of 
the formal approach for comparative research is that electoral laws in different countries 
are not universal, they do not have an unambiguous interpretation due to ambiguity in 
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wording, and, in addition, may contradict other (national or international) regulatory 
documents (Lehoucq, 2003). 
According to a substantive approach, electoral manipulation is understood as 
deliberate violations of electoral legislation by political actors and as manipulation of the 
electoral process in private interests. The ruling elites and their agents are usually 
considered subjects of electoral manipulation. For example, Schedler described a "Menu 
of manipulation" where authoritarian incumbents choose tactics to shift the electoral 
process in their own from removing opposition parties and candidates to the election race 
to adopting disproportionate electoral systems and carrying out fraud on election day 
(Schedler, 2002). 
From the point of substantive approach, several types of electoral manipulations 
can be distinguished. The first type includes manipulation of electoral institutions, 
including electoral systems, when the rules for holding elections are set so that they 
systematically favor certain political actors to the detriment of other participants in the 
electoral process (Birch, 2011). The second type is the manipulation of voters' preferences 
and political choices. This type of manipulation, like the first, is usually implemented on 
the eve of elections and is associated with influencing voters, parties, and candidates. 
Examples include censorship in the media, coercion of voters into specific types of 
electoral behavior, and depriving opposition parties and candidates of the opportunity to 
participate in elections. Finally, the third type of manipulation is the process of voting 
and counting of votes, for example, excluding certain voters from the voter lists, 
disrupting the operation of voting premises, falsifying the results of voter will (Ibid).  
In the monograph "Electoral Malpractice," Birch set a goal to identify factors that 
encourage incumbents to manipulate the electoral process. According to her, the fear of 
losing legitimacy restrains the willingness of political leaders to use electoral 
manipulation. The researcher determined that all types of electoral malpractice are 
systematically accompanied by the dominance of hierarchical social ties in society. A 
developed civil society is a barrier to electoral abuse. Simpser considers that electoral 
manipulations are needed to get the minimum necessary result to maintain authority by 




In addition to differentiating the types of electoral manipulations in the scientific 
literature, it is presented why some incumbents use more manipulations while others use 
less. In the monograph Electoral Malpractice Birch, identifying the factors that induce 
incumbents to manipulate the electoral process. She used an Index of Electoral 
Malpractice, constructed from an analysis of the reports of observation missions that 
worked from 1995 to 2007 in elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and Central and South Africa. This index was 
compiled for each of the three types of electoral abuse identified earlier, i.e., for 
manipulating electoral institutions, voter preferences, as well as the voting process and 
counting of votes. According to Birch, the fear of losing legitimacy within the country or 
abroad is the main factor holding back the readiness of political leaders to resort to 
electoral manipulation. The researcher determined that all types of electoral abuse are 
systematically accompanied by the dominance of hierarchical social ties in a given society 
(the independent variable is the level of corruption); and a developed civil society (the 
independent variable is freedom of the media), on the contrary, is a barrier to electoral 
abuse. It has been shown that the quality of electoral integrity will be higher in political 
regimes with an independent judiciary, free media, and a developed civil society (Ibid).  
Simpser, who considered manipulation of voters' preferences, as well as the voting 
process and counting of votes, has a different position. In his opinion, electoral 
manipulations are not needed to obtain the minimum necessary result for the incumbent 
or the Incumbent party to maintain power. The main purpose of manipulation is indirect 
informational functions related to depriving the electoral hopes of potential opponents of 
the regime and "keeping in check" political supporters (Simpser, 2013). 
Thus, the manipulations will be large-scale. In addition, this opportunity appears 
in societies where the incumbent's resources significantly exceed the resources of his 
opponents. If incumbents exist in an environment where resources are distributed among 
different groups of actors, manipulation will only be used to maintain power. Simpser 
refined Birch's line of reasoning regarding the logic of electoral manipulation. In essence, 
the conclusions of their work on the factors that restrain the manipulative potential of the 
incumbent do not contradict each other. 
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Thus, Simpser's theory of falsifications is based on the fact that interference in the 
course of elections is not so much instrumental (a tool for ensuring victory) but 
informational. Using falsifications, one can create an image of an irresistible political 
force and influence a vast number of actors, from the opposition to the adherents of the 
regime, which, in fact, is their primary goal. 
Rozenas tried to understand the reasons for manipulating the electoral process in 
the regimes of electoral authoritarianism before election day. He agrees with A. Simpser's 
thesis that the incumbent needs elections to demonstrate to other political actors the 
stability of his position and the presence of support in society (Rozenas, 2016). The signal 
given through elections will be the more convincing, the higher the real level of support 
for the incumbent and the lower the level of falsification. At the same time, an unpopular 
incumbent who won the election solely through manipulation will not be able to send a 
signal to the political system about the stability of his positions, which is fraught with the 
loss of power. Thus, the question that arises before an authoritarian incumbent who does 
not want to lose elections or lose power is what type and volume of manipulations to use 
during a political campaign in order to show the stability of his regime and reduce the 
likelihood of losing power. The researcher concludes that incumbents who face a greater 
risk of losing power before the elections will manipulate the electoral process less than 
incumbents who are confident in their position since a victory in a rigged the election 
threatens the first with equally unpleasant consequences as a defeat. The latter will use 
manipulation as insurance against an unlikely but possible loss. 
Therefore, we can conclude that popular and influential incumbents, who do not 
have obstacles from the organized opposition and do not experience pressure from civil 
society institutions, have much more opportunities to manipulate the electoral process in 
their interests—using a vast repertoire of techniques for this, than incumbents, which are 
less popular and have restrictions on complete freedom of action. 
The papers reviewed, except for Birch's study, did not focus on electoral 
engineering. At the same time, Birch presented only the most general conclusions that 
cannot be reduced without additional reservations to the phenomenon of the 
transformation of electoral systems in non-democratic regimes (Birch 2011). However, 
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several case studies have been devoted to explaining the logic of electoral engineering in 
autocracies. 
Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni described electoral engineering in Mexico under the 
dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP) (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 
2001). In their opinion, the long-term majority of the IRP in the Mexican Congress 
Chamber of Deputies was ensured by electoral rules. To obtain a disproportionately large 
number of IRP mandates, the single-seat constituencies by plurality was used. At the same 
time, the opposition parties consistently achieved success in multi-member districts 
according to a proportional system, they did not have incentives to coordinate around 
single candidates and to form anti-incubation coalitions, since even in total the number 
of seats they received in parliament was always less than that of the IRP.  Thus, this 
combination of electoral rules allowed for a long time to maintain a leading position, 
despite the decline in popular support, the economic crisis, and corruption scandals (Ibid: 
271). 
Tan showed how manipulation of electoral rules helps Singapore's ruling party, 
the People's Action Party (PAP), which provides a majority of seats in the national 
parliament, despite the decline in popularity that began in the second half of the 1980s 
(Tan 2013).  One of the critical things in maintaining power over the PAP was the 1988 
electoral reform, which introduced a bloc vote electoral system in Singapore that yields 
highly disproportionate results for a large party. However, less disproportionate systems 
(due to the presence of political opposition in the country) could be risky for the PAP, 
and the use of other manipulations during voting and counting of votes, allegedly, was 
unacceptable to the Singapore authorities because of the risk of losing legitimacy (Ibid).  
Examples of Mexico and Singapore show that the degree of inclusiveness of 
electoral systems may be inversely related to the strength of the opposition and the 
openness of the political regime. Studying the Middle East countries, Lust-Okar and 
Jamal (Lust-Okar 2002) concluded that in the liberalization stage, when the incumbent 
loses part of its power relying on the dominant parties, he/she will establish electoral 
systems that will be favorable to the ruling party and, at the same time, the opposition 
will be disadvantageous. 
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Gandhi and Heller also considered the issue of electoral engineering in 
authoritarian regimes. They put forward a number of assumptions about the dynamics of 
changes in the rules for holding elections in non-democratic regimes. First, incumbents 
are the main actors in changing electoral systems in such regimes (Gandhi and Heller 
2018). Autocrats may adopt electoral systems that favor them or the incumbent party. 
Still, at the same time, they may have other strategies for staying in power besides 
manipulating election rules. They may also face certain restrictions (opposition from the 
opposition or lack of information on consequences of institutional choice) when using the 
“rules of the game”. 
Therefore, for an incumbent or an incumbent party to keep power and legitimacy, 
it is necessary to create conditions where the opposition cannot win the election. The use 
of solid forms of manipulation (propaganda or falsification) can cause protests among 
citizens. These outcomes could be highly probable in regions with relatively open 
political systems or higher level of democracy, where independent institutions of civil 
society, political competition remained, and the population's protest potential was 
relatively high (Petrov et al 2013). And, on the contrary, in regions where democratic 
institutions were poorly developed, one could not expect widespread electoral 
engineering. 
This paragraph has provided an overview of how electoral engineering has been 
studied in the context of authoritarian regimes. Since the transformations of electoral 
systems in such regimes are associated with the actions of authoritarian incumbents, 
electoral engineering was considered in the paragraph through the prism of the 
components of the “menu of manipulations”. At the disposal of autocrats: manipulation 
of voters' preferences, as well as the voting process and vote counting. The studies 
reviewed show that the use of authoritarian forms of electoral manipulation is 
accompanied by a particular set of conditions: the popularity of an autocrat, the weakness 
of the opposition and civil society institutions, and systematic violations of the rule of 
law. It can be concluded that electoral engineering may be in inverse relation to the factors 




1.5. Political environment of modern Russian Federation 
 
The regions' transition to new electoral systems coincided with the transformation 
of the Russian political regime (Golosov 2011). Thus, throughout the existence of the 
Russian Federation, the political system has transformed from Yeltsin's attempts to make 
a democratic transition in the 90s to the construction of a “vertical of power” by Putin in 
the 21st century. 
The Russian political regime in the 1990s was competitive authoritarianism 
(Levitsky and Way 2002). While elections in this type of regime are regular, free from 
massive fraud, and can even lead to a change in political leadership, the capabilities and 
resources of government and opposition forces are unequal. Representatives of the 
government control the media, use administrative resources to their advantage and use 
various forms of pressure on critics of the regime. 
As Levitsky and Way point out, competitive authoritarianism should be 
distinguished not only from democracy but also from simulated electoral regimes, where 
the institution of elections exists, but does not matter (Ibid). One of these regimes is 
electoral authoritarianism. Despite formally competitive elections, the opposition has no 
chance in a legal struggle to replace the ruling groups, parliament and courts are 
subordinate to the executive branch, and the media are censored. This type of political 
regime was established in Russia in the second half of the 2000s. 
The last twenty years' main content has been the federal government's desire to 
restore control over the regional elites and systematic work to weaken them, and the actual 
creation of a single ecosystem of the national and regional bureaucracy. As a result, the 
authorities began to limit regional elites and political players in literally everything from 
electoral rules and procedures to naming. In fact, instead of the previous semi-feudal 
system, where the provincial authorities received opportunities for omnipotence on the 
territory of the region in exchange for political loyalty to the sovereign (president), a 
system of parallel verticals was created closed to various structures in the presidential 
administration. These verticals also affected the social and political sphere, significantly 
intensifying in the next period of the actual appointment of governors in 2005-2012 
(Kynev 2009).  
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The main element of the new national policy towards the regions was the electoral 
reform, which reduced the number of players eligible to take part in elections (for 
example, the ban on regional parties). Since July 14, 2003, the regions are obliged to elect 
at least half of the deputies of legislative assemblies according to the proportional system 
(Federal Law 67 2002). Since 2007, the regions have lost the right to elect their deputies 
to the State Duma directly: a fully proportional one replaced the mixed system in federal 
elections. Thus, political parties began to register exclusively at the national level, and 
opportunities started to be created for direct influence on regional deputies from the center 
(the national bureaucracy controlled the party bureaucracy, which increasingly influenced 
the deputies). National parties have become de facto monopolists in nominating 
candidates, and the number of parties has constantly been decreasing, reaching a 
minimum of seven parties by 2008. For example, in 1999, 26 parties and blocs took part 
in the elections to the State Duma, while in 1995, there were 43.  
It is essential to understand that the decrease in the number of parties and the 
prohibition of independent candidates from participating in elections was the national 
government's will and the presidential administration. Before the total introduction of 
elections according to party lists in the regions in the last "pre-reform" 2002, the share of 
nominees of electoral associations among the elected deputies of regional parliaments 
was only 9.6% (in 2001 it was 14.3%). In fact, these were non-partisan elections (Central 
Election Commission of the Russian Federation 2001). 
According to Gel’man, the establishment of electoral authoritarianism in Russia 
was achieved through three mechanisms: super-presidentialism, centralized subnational 
authoritarianism, and a dominant party (Gel’man 2015). After Vladimir Putin came to 
power and the coalition of regional elites was defeated in the parliamentary elections in 
1999, the elected president was able to increase his political resources and significantly 
strengthen his dominance over other participants in the political process. This was 
facilitated by the favorable situation in world oil prices in the 2000s (Kudrin 2013). As a 
result, the presidential administration, being the main institutionalized veto player, 
established control over the executive branch and introduced the United Russia party into 
the legislative branch at all levels (Roberts 2012: 235). Thus, the president solved the 
principal-agent dilemma within the “vertical of power”. As a result, regional actors were 
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built into relations with the head of state and actually ceased to represent the interests of 
the region's citizens. 
In the context of the paper, it seems important to consider the political mechanisms 
that have subjugated regional political regimes. Two circumstances were of crucial 
importance: introducing the party of power into the regional electoral arenas and the 
abolition of gubernatorial elections (Schedler 2006). The purpose of these two tasks was 
to solve the commitment problem of regional elites, first of all, heads of regions to the 
policy pursued by the central government (Reuter 2009). To this end, the Center needed 
to increase the attractiveness of the “party of power” among the regional establishment 
and reduce the benefits of alternative political coordination for its representatives. 
However, the introduction of the "party of power" into the regions was not enough 
for the Presidential Administration to subordinate the political regimes of the regions to 
its influence. Subsequently, a set of legislative measures was implemented, called in the 
authoritarian literature adaptation (White 2005), which reduced the alternative party 
proposal. Among the most important are the increase in the minimum number of political 
parties to 50 thousand members, the abolition of electoral blocs in elections at all levels, 
the introduction of a single voting day, and the tightening of the rules for registering 
candidates and party lists. 
The key measure that solved the commitment problem of regional elites to the 
Center (federal government) was the cancellation of the gubernatorial elections. In order 
to maintain trust in the central government, the heads of the regions were forced to make 
efforts to create special conditions that would guarantee the irremovability of the ruling 
group, to which they were also a member. The consequence of this was a radical 
strengthening of the positions of the United Russia party in all regional political arenas. 
The heads of the executive branch were left with no choice but to use its resources as the 
primary tool for interacting with local elites and achieving their own goals (Gel’man 
2015). 
Researchers have found that regional policy is determined by factors related to 
regional leaders' purposeful activity and contextual factors related to ethnicity or the 
degree of development of democratic institutions (Golosov 2011). Thus, the variables 
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associated with the dynamics of regional policy should also be considered when analyzing 
electoral engineering at the level of the Russian regions. 
It is important to understand that the decrease in the number of parties and the 
prohibition of independent candidates from participating in elections was the national 
government's will and the presidential administration. Before the complete introduction 
of elections according to party lists in the regions in the last "pre-reform" 2002, the share 
of nominees of electoral associations among the elected deputies of regional parliaments 
was only 9.6% (in 2001 it was 14.3%). In fact, these were non-partisan elections (Central 
Election Commission of the Russian Federation 2001). 
By subjugating the regional bureaucracy and forcing it to support United Russia, 
the federal government significantly weakened (and after abolishing the elections of 
governors almost eliminated) the competition of administrative resources, which replaced 
the still unformed party competition. Thus, in the 2000s, the party-political regime can be 
characterized as a regime of total domination of the executive branch, where the ruling 
party imitating the dominant one plays an auxiliary role in additional structuring of elites 
at various levels, being in a dependent and subordinate position concerning the executive 
branch. This system gradually descended lower and lower, from the national to the local 
level. To a large extent, the peak of forced unification was during the reign of Dmitry 
Medvedev (President of Russia in 2008-2012), when even the use of party lists in 
municipal elections became mandatory. 
But by 2011, the socio-economic conditions had changed. It became clear that the 
political restrictions of citizens could cause protests and discontent in the country, which 
occurred in Eastern Europe in the late 90s and early 90s. In 2011 and 2012, the most 
massive protests all over Russia over the entire period of Vladimir Putin's rule after the 
parliamentary and presidential elections took place. As a result, since 2012, the party 
legislation has been drastically changing towards the registration of the most significant 
possible number of parties, reducing protest votes. 
The national government faced the predictable side effects of these decisions. 
Gradually, in 2012–2013, along with political technology, fake parties, real new projects, 
and leaders began to appear; in the regions, representatives of local elites began to leave 
for new projects, and the influence of all old parties started to weaken (Volkov 2012: 5-
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8). Thus, a new wave of cleansing operations and the struggle with the new political 
leaders began, but they still began to achieve success. The most striking examples of this 
process were the success of Alexei Navalny in 2013, who received more votes in the 
elections for mayor of Moscow than all the candidates of the old parties combined, as 
well as the election of Yevgeny Roizman as mayor of Yekaterinburg (the fourth largest 
city in Russia by population) (Kynev 2014: 105).  
The initial response to this was to diminish the role of parties. This was reflected 
in the adoption soon of the so-called Klishas law 2013, which reduced from 50 to 25% 
the mandatory share of deputies of regional parliaments, who were elected according to 
the proportional system introduced in 2003. For Moscow and St. Petersburg, the 
requirement for the mandatory use of party lists was completely abolished. This law also 
completely abolished the requirements, introduced under Medvedev, of the minimum 
share of deputies elected under the proportional system for local governments. Thus, the 
tactical decision led to the actual cancellation of the critical electoral reform of the 2000s 
(Ibid: 53). The authorities have been destroying sites where parties can succeed, and a 
new municipal reform was announced in December 2013. As a result, the regions had the 
right to cancel direct elections of mayors without the municipalities' consent, replacing 
elections with the delegation from settlements.  
The 2016 State Duma elections were decided to return to a mixed system (225 
deputies by districts and 225 by party lists). In part, these elections meant a return to the 
electoral formula of 1993-2003. However, even compared with the 1990s, they had 
several significant differences associated mainly with stricter rules for admission to 
participation in elections, radically increased qualifications, and minimization of public 
control. The goal of the reform was to preserve the formal majority of United Russia. In 
Russian conditions, candidates with either administrative support or independent reliable 
financial and organizational resources can win in majoritarian districts. But in Russian 
conditions, such candidates are almost always on the authorities' side. Otherwise little 
will soon be left of their business. Administrative resources and finances can be replaced 
by the high personal popularity of a candidate, but it is difficult to find it even for such 
independent units. Thus, in the elections of deputies to regional parliaments in 2015, 
United Russia won more than 90% of districts across the regions (Central Election 
Commission of the Russian Federation, 2015). The remaining formally lost constituencies 
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are de facto given by United Russia to close candidates whom the party itself could not 
nominate for various reasons (for example, image reasons).  
Thus, over the 21st century, the national government has been actively building a 
vertical of power, limiting the possibilities for some political forces to come to power. 
Therefore, the elections became a formal event to demonstrate to the population and the 
international community the legitimacy of the ruling party and its supporters. 
The paragraph describes the trajectory of the development of the political regime 
in Russia since the early 1990s. After the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections, the 
heads of the regions, who were key actors in the political process in the constituent entities 
of the federation, were integrated into the hierarchical system of relations with the 
national government and, in addition to their interests, had to take into account the 
incentives emanating from the national level, which consisted in the fact that in order to 
maintain the needed to ensure high results for the United Russia party, including in 
regional elections. The paragraph identified the key players in the transformation of 
regional electoral systems. It is to them that the theoretical framework of the study will 
be applied, the description of which is devoted to the next paragraph. 
1.6. The theoretical framework of empirical research 
Rational choice institutionalism is used as a theory in this study. The algorithm 
for applying the theory of rational choice institutionalism requires identifying key actors 
who have the ability to influence the decision-making process, determine their goals and 
strategies, and identify the set of institutions where these actors function. In this paper, 
the following are considered as key actors in changing regional electoral systems: the 
federal executive power (national government), the heads of the executive power of the 
regions of the Russian Federation (governors), and the political party "United Russia". 
All three of these actors seem to have a common goal in electoral engineering at the 
regional level: strengthening the power positions. The national government strategies 
regarding electoral engineering at the subnational level depended, first of all, on the 
dynamics of the political process at the country level as a whole, as well as on information 
about the effects of electoral systems and their individual parameters. The governors' 
activity concerning electoral engineering appears to have been mediated, on the one hand, 
by the legislative framework established for the regions by the national government, as 
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well as their ability to resort to electoral abuses in the interests of the “party in power”. 
United Russia functioned in conditions of limited opportunities, since, on the one hand, 
it was a political instrument in the hands of the national government, and, on the other 
hand, in many regions, the governors controlled the factions of the United Russia party.  
This approach was one of the most common theoretical models in political science 
at the end of the 20th century and remained a popular research tool to this day. Institutions 
play a central role in the political process: within their framework, interactions between 
political actors occur. Moreover, as noted in the scientific literature (Gandhi 2008, 
Schedler 2013), institutions are important in democratic political regimes and regimes of 
electoral authoritarianism. 
The rational choice institutionalism theory in political science goes back to the 
classical rational choice theory by Downs (Downs 1957) but develops it through the prism 
of institutions. Thus, researchers using this analytic tool aim to explain policy outcomes 
by considering actors driven by self-maximizing goals and the institutions where these 
actors are immersed. 
Talking about institutions, it should be emphasized that, according to the new 
institutionalism, they are both formal (political, legal, economic rules) and informal 
(generally accepted rules) (North 1990). In the context of studying the political process 
of modern Russia through the prism of neo-institutionalism, it has to be noted that in 
Russian politics, informal rules are no less important than formal norms, just as they were 
in Soviet times (Gel’man 2004).  
According to rational choice institutionalism, the political process consists not 
only of rational actors but also of a set of institutional rules and norms that they interact 
(Shepsle 1989: 135); these rules and norms restrain their selfish aspirations. Since 
institutions are associated with implementing specific outcomes, which may be both 
desirable and undesirable for political actors, the latter may seek to manipulate 
institutional rules. This statement is important for understanding the essence of rational 
choice institutionalism: institutions are perceived as structures exposed to the influence 
of actors facing a change in the status quo (McFaul 1999: 29-30). 
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Geddes proposes an algorithm for applying the Rational Choice Institutionalism 
(the rational choice approach) in political science research (Geddes 2003: 191). Firstly, it 
is necessary to identify the key actors for this study explicitly, that is, those actors of the 
political process. They have the required amount of resources to be able to influence the 
decision-making process. Secondly, it is necessary to define their goals and strategies. 
Thirdly, it is essential to identify the institutions that define the set of available strategies, 
where the actors choose the most suitable to achieve their goals, depending on the costs 
and benefits associated with these strategies. 
Rational choice institutionalism has been repeatedly applied to analyze political 
processes in Russian regions (Reuter 2013). It has been used to explain institutional 
building (McFaul 1999) and regime transformations (Gel’man 2015) at the state level. 
This theoretical framework is also an analytical tool for electoral authoritarianism 
regimes researchers (Schedler 2013).  
Rational choice institutionalism has advantages over the historical and 
sociological new institutionalism in this work. The theoretical framework of historical 
institutionalism is better suited to explaining why institutions reproduce over time than to 
explain the reasons for their transformations (Peters 2005). There have been more than 
two hundred changes in the basic parameters of regional electoral systems between 2003 
and 2018. If we talk about sociological institutionalism, it diminishes the instrumental 
nature of actors in developing norms and practices (Hall, Taylor 1996: 951), while the 
phenomenon of electoral engineering in autocracies considered in this paper is a 
derivative of the purposeful activity of politicians. 
In this paper, the key actors in changing regional electoral systems are the federal 
executive power (the Federal Center or national government), the heads of the executive 
power of the Russian Federation regions (governors), and the United Russia party. All 
three of these actors seem to have a common goal in terms of electoral engineering at the 
regional level: strengthening their power positions. 
The national government, having significantly increased economic resources in 
the 2000s and gained the opportunity to intervene in political processes at the regional 
level, began to actively dictate the will of regional actors, including regarding the rules 
for holding provincial elections. The Center achieved the consolidation of its power 
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positions at the regional level by introducing United Russia party entities into the political 
arenas. The Center's strategies regarding electoral engineering at the subnational level 
depended on the dynamics of the political process at the country level, which was most 
clearly reflected in the results of federal parliamentary elections, as well as information 
on the effects of electoral systems and their individual parameters. 
Throughout the post-Soviet period, governors were the main centers of power in 
the constituent entities (Reuter 2013). After the election of heads of regions was canceled, 
they began to depend on the national government. They were forced to make significant 
efforts to ensure high electoral results for the United Russia party, which was the primary 
condition for them to survive in office (Reuter, Robertson 2013: 1032). The governors' 
activity in relation to electoral engineering was mediated by the legislative framework 
established by the federal electoral legislation, as well as their ability to resort to other 
types of electoral abuse in the interests of the "party in power". 
United Russia, transformed in the second half of the 2000s into the dominant party 
(Hale 2006) and being the subject of electoral competition, could also have interests 
related to the rules for holding elections at the level of regions. As a large party, United 
Russia would benefit from highly disproportionate electoral systems that would provide 
additional seats in regional legislatures through their mechanical effects. However, to 
implement these alleged intentions, United Russia had quite a few opportunities, since it 
remained only a political instrument in the hands of the national government, which 
significantly limited its subjectivity, and, in many regions, the offices and factions of the 
United Russia party were controlled by governors and therefore they did not have their 
legislative agenda. 
The rest of the Russian parties, including the most powerful in the 1990s, the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in the period under consideration (2003-
2018) lost resources of influence on the political process of both countries and regions, 
therefore, in this study, they are not considered as self-sufficient actors. 
The paragraph described the rational choice institutionalism theory, which is the 
theoretical framework of the research. According to the algorithm for applying the theory, 
the national government, the heads of the regions, and the United Russia party are singled 
out as key actors in the change in regional electoral systems. Also, in this paragraph, the 
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institutions were designated where these actors implemented their strategies regarding the 




Chapter 2.  Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
The dissertation's research question is what factors influence the change in the 
regional electoral systems in Russia. Based on the theoretical framework and scientific 
background, in this section I formulate research design and hypotheses. 
2.1. Research design and hypotheses 
 
In the early 2000s, the national government was building a model of subordination 
of all regions to the Kremlin, namely the Vertical of Power. It means that it was interested 
in the control of the executive and legislative branches of the province. By creating a 
vertical of power, the national government ensured political stability throughout the 
country. Carrying out political reforms in the early 2000s, which limited the opposition's 
electoral opportunities, caused a series of protests in many Russian regions (Kynev 2009). 
A large number of regions did not want to submit to the federal government. It is 
especially true for national republics and rich regions with a high level of political culture. 
In these regions, a so-called high level of democracy is recorded, where there is political 
pluralism, independent media, and a low level of corruption. These regions are prone to 
protests and expressions of opposition to the national government (Titkov 2013). 
In conditions of electoral authoritarianism, the National Government is not 
interested in such protest actions. Various methods are used to overcome them. On the 
one hand, these can be violent methods such as repression, arrest of the opposition, 
declaring political organizations as terrorist groups, etc. But such strategies can ruin the 
reputation of the authorities both among the electorate and in the international arena. 
Therefore, incumbents in authoritarian countries prefer to use more formal and 
institutional tools. In the paragraph "Russian political environment," I described what 
new electoral rules have appeared in the Russian regions: it can be from the banning of 
regional parties and the cancellation of gubernatorial elections to the transformation of 
the electoral system. 
In MA dissertation, I suggest that in regions with open political systems (or a high 
level of democracy), the probability of changing electoral systems is higher than in the 
non-democratic areas. The level of democracy in the region is the level of development 
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of the democratic institutions of the Russian region, which include the following factors: 
media freedom, political pluralism, democratic elections, the independence of the courts, 
developed civil society, and low corruption. 
In this research, I will use the democracy index of Russian regions by Petrov and 
Titkov from Moscow Carnegie Center (Petrov & Titkov 2013) and regional results of 
legislature elections in order to operationalize the level of democracy of Russian regions. 
This rating includes expert opinions on ten socio-political factors, including the level of 
corruption, openness, democratic elections, political pluralism, media independence, and 
others. The research of Titkov and Petrov is quite complete and independent since the 
Moscow Carnegie Center is a regional affiliate of the nonprofit organization Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Therefore, I assume that  
H1: the higher the level of democracy in the region, the more changes in the 
electoral system 
In the second half of the 2000s, United Russia became the dominant party (Hale 
2006). It could be related to election rules at the regional level as well. According to 
Gel’man, Russian electoral authoritarianism consists of three parts: super-presidency, 
centralized subnational authoritarianism, and the dominant party (Gel’man 2008). All of 
these parts create the “Vertical of power” in Russia (Ibid). The idea of this is 
centralization and control of Russian regions by the national government (executive 
branch) through the loyalty of governors and regional parliaments. President Putin 
implemented this in the 2000s (Roberts 2012: 235). Creating a ruling party would not 
have been possible without institutional changes and election rules at both the state and 
regional levels. As a large party of United Russia, highly disproportionate electoral 
systems would be profitable, supplying it, due to their mechanical effects, with additional 
seats in regional legislatures.  
According to the Vertical of Power, it was crucial to subordinate the regional elites 
in the person of the governors to the national government and introduce the party of power 
in local parliaments. Before Putin's rule, governors were key players in the region's 
politics. They often opposed the Kremlin after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(examples: the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Chechnya, which had two 
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Chechen wars in the late 1990s). To subordinate the heads of regions to the national 
government, the governor elections were canceled.  Now the head of the region was 
appointed by the regional parliament, and the President proposed a candidate for this 
position. Thus, the position of the authority of the region ceased to be elective and became 
appointed by the President of the Russian Federation. And one of the tasks of the 
appointed governor was to ensure high results for the United Russia party at all levels of 
elections, both national and local regional. 
In this paradigm, I assume that the governors could ensure the victory of United 
Russia without the use of falsification, propaganda, and other non-institutional 
manipulations. Consequently, I believe that electoral engineering was less pronounced in 
regions headed by governors, who had the resources to mobilize a vast network of loyal 
electoral manipulation agents at the local level. According to Rundlett and Svolik 
(Rundlett et al 2016), such a network of faithful subordinate executors of electoral fraud 
is necessary to organize manipulations with voters' preferences and vote counting. 
Consequently, the more opportunities the head of the region had to build a hierarchical 
system of patron-client relations with local actors, the easier it is for United Russia to 
achieve a high result with the help of complex manipulative techniques, and the need for 
additional measures to ensure the result for “ party in power,” in particular, through 
electoral engineering simply would not exist. 
While in power for a large number of years, the governor could obtain a sufficient 
number of agents and networks to ensure high results for the party in power without 
additional changes in the electoral environment. Accordingly, in the regions where the 
governor has been in power for a long time, changes in the electoral system are expected 
to be minimal.  
H2: the more the governor rules in the region, the less there will be changes in 
the electoral system 
Moreover, Hale paid attention to the fact that the ability of regional leaders to 
create and debug political machines based on clientelistic relations with local actors was 
associated with ethnicity. Governors, especially in republics and regions with a compact 
population of ethnic minorities, often provided these minorities with particular types of 
club goods in exchange for their electoral loyalty. As a result, the heads of regions had 
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agents whose resources could be helpful during the period—election campaigns (Hale 
2007: 231). Since governors with a large proportion of ethnic groups in the regions can 
mobilize the local electorate, I assume that regions with a large number of non-Russian 
populations are not subject to electoral system transformation. 
H3: in regions with a large number of ethnic groups, electoral changes were 
minimal 
The next participant who is interested in transforming regional electoral systems 
is the ruling party, United Russia. Of course, as a political organization, it cannot be 
considered as a separate player in the transformation of electoral systems. Still, at the 
same time, within the framework of the phenomenon of the ruling party, it is the patron 
of the national government (presidential administration), and this is most interested in 
creating the most favorable conditions for ensuring the victory of the United Russia at 
local levels. Accordingly, I assume that in the regions where United Russia won less than 
50% of the seats in the parliament (sufficient to control the legislature), the most 
significant number of changes in the electoral system will take place. 
H4: the regions where United Russia won less than 50% of the parliamentary 
seats, the most significant number of electoral changes were conducted. 
It is difficult to say that a total authoritarian regime was built in Russia. According 
to Levitsky and Way, this is competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky et al. 2002). 
Formally, in this regime, there are institutions and rules that imply a procedure for 
changing power. But in fact, the opposition has no chance to win the election due to the 
lack of independent courts, media, and the rule of law. Moreover, special institutional 
conditions are created by the central executive branch (president, national government), 
where parties and independent candidates cannot participate in elections (Golosov 2011). 
For example, the abolition of electoral blocs and unions, the number increase of party 
members, the tightening of the rules for registering candidates and parties, etc. At the 
same time, it is possible to take electoral rules (electoral engineering), making it 
impossible for political actors to win during elections. 
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Electoral engineering is the use of parameters of the electoral system, which 
contribute to the high result of United Russia. As a large party, United Russia takes 
benefits from a reduction in the number of parliamentarians, small proportional districts, 
high threshold percentage, as well as methods of transferring votes to seats within the 
proportional electoral system disproportionately awarding large parties (Colomer 2005: 
4-5).  
According to Lijphart, a high percentage of the threshold provides more seats for 
large parties and reduces the proportionality in the assembly (Lijphart 1994). Taagepera 
and Shugart believe that the size of the district also affects proportional representation. 
Large districts have more favorable to small parties (Taagepera et al. 1989). Changes in 
these parameters could provide more votes for the ruling party (United Russia). 
In MA dissertation, I will pay attention to changes in electoral systems in the 
Russian regions. The dependent variable is the change in the electoral system (electoral 
engineering) in the regions, such as the threshold percentage, percentage of deputies 
elected by the proportional system, and the number of parliamentarians in the legislature. 
Also in this paper, the variable Electoral Engineering was designed, which was calculated 
from the sum of electoral changes (the threshold percentage, percentage of deputies 
elected by the proportional system, and the number of parliamentarians in the legislature) 
in the region. Electrical engineering is also one of the independent variables. All data will 
be taken from regional laws and legal acts on regional elections from 2003 to 2018. For 
MA dissertation, I will take all Russian regions except Sevastopol and Crimea. 2003-
2008: 87 regions; 2008-2013: 83 regions (some regions were united in ones), 2013-2018: 
83 regions. 
The Vertical of Power construction involves the control of regional parliaments 
by United Russia. In regions with a low level of democracy (lack of political competition, 
free press, civil society) and a strong governor, this is easy to provide a large number of 
votes for the presidential party through voters buying, falsifications, mobilization of the 
electorate (voters controlled by the government: army, officials, civil servants). On the 
other hand, in democratic regions, the use of these methods can cause protests. Therefore, 
the national government must apply more legal tools to ensure the victory of United 
Russia in more democratic regions. 
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Units of analysis and observation, time limits of the research 
The unit of analysis is the region, and the unit of observation is the electoral 
system at the time of the given parliamentary elections in the region. The lower 
chronological limit of the study is 2003, when the first elections were held in compliance 
with the rule on the election of at least half of the deputies of regional assemblies by a 
proportional electoral system. The upper chronological limit is 2018. The period 2003 to 
2008 is designated as the first cycle of regional parliamentary elections under the “new 
rules”; the period from 2008 to 2013 is the second cycle, and the period from 2014 to 
2018 is the third cycle. 
Sources 
Information from expert ratings and collections, population censuses, and 
electronic databases was used to construct independent variables. The data on the degree 
of the democratic character of the political regimes of the regions were taken from the 
expert rating of the democratic character of Russian regions of the Carnegie Moscow 
Center, prepared by Petrov and Titkov. The data on the share of the non-Russian and rural 
population in the regions were obtained from the materials of the All-Russian population 
censuses of 2002 and 2010. The results of regional elections and the terms of governors' 
office were taken from the websites of the regional election commissions. The data for 
constructing the Electoral Engineering Level was taken from constitutions and legislation 
on elections and referenda in the regions. The sources of the data were the official portals 





2.2. Description of dependent and independent variables  
 
In this study, three models were made divided into three electoral cycles into 
Russian regions. The lower time limit for the study is December 2003, when the first 
elections to the parliaments of the constituent entities were held with the application of 
the rules on the election of at least half of the deputies through the electoral system; the 
upper limit is September 2018. 
The period from 2003 to 2007 is the first cycle of elections under the new rules, 
when the first convocations of regional parliaments were elected, where at least half of 
the seats went to deputies who were on the list. The period from 2008 to 2013 covers the 
second cycle; from 2014 to 2018, there is a third cycle. 
The empirical research presented in the dissertation is variably focused. Logistic 
regression was used to analyze quantitative data. A feature of this method, based on 
probabilistic logic, is that the results obtained with its help reflect the general trend to the 
studied phenomenon. 
The dependent variable is the level of electoral engineering in the Russian regions. 
As mentioned above, this variable is based on the sum of the parameters of the 
transformation of the regional electoral system: the number of deputies elected according 
to the proportional system, the change in the size of the regional parliament and the 
electoral threshold.  
Parameter  Specification Value 
Number of parliamentarians 
Increase or maintain size 0 
Size reduction 1 







<= 5% 0 
>5% 1 
Max. level of Electoral Engineering  3 
Min. level of Electoral Engineering 0 
 
Table 1. The level of electoral changes in Russian regions 
 
Summing up all these parameters, the maximum value is 3, which means that the 
region has made the maximum number of changes to the rules for conducting before the 
election, and 0 is the minimum. Using the logistic regression method, I set the binary 
values 0 and 1 for the dependent variable, where are no or minor changes, and 1 is a 
significant change in the electoral system of the region. Thus, for 0 the level of Electoral 
Engineering must be 0 or 1; for 1 there is 2 or 3. 
In addition, in this study, I will try to find a correlation between specific 
parameters (change in parliament size, electoral threshold, and the number of deputies 
elected according to the proportional system) and the independent variables through 
logistic regression. This will help me understand what factors could influence specific 
changes in the electoral system in a particular electoral cycle. Thus, I will determine what 
could have affected the overall change in the electoral rules and a specific parameter.  
 
The independent variables are: 
 
 The level of democracy in the region. 
 The number of non-Russian population in the region. 
 The term the governor office. 




To operationalize the level of democracy in the regions, I use the Petrov and 
Titkov Democratic Regions Ranking from the Carnegie Moscow Center (Petrov and 
Titkov, 2013). This index includes parameters that determine the level of democracy in 
the regions of Russia: regional political structure; openness of the political system; 
democratic elections; political pluralism; independence of the media; the level of 
corruption; economic liberalization; civil society; turnover of political elites; local 
government. The maximum value for this is 40, which means the highest level of 
democracy in the region, 0 is the minimum. Data for this will be used as general 
continuous from 0 to 40. 
The second variable related to governors is the office term of the head of the region 
at the time of elections, calculated through the difference in years between the start of the 
governor's office and the election date. It is assumed that in a region where the governor 
has ruled for many years, changes in the electoral system will be minor since he/she has 
enough strength to ensure a high result of the party in power. Conversely, a newly 
hired/elected regional leader will initiate as many changes as possible in the regional 
system to prove loyalty to the national government. The data will be the number of years 
from the beginning of the governor's rule to the date of the election. 
For the share of the non-Russian population, data was taken from the population 
census. In the research, I use the percentage of non-Russian population (the value of the 
variable will be from 0 to 100). It is expected that the more ethnic groups live in the 
region, then the governor will be able to mobilize the local population to ensure the 
victory of the ruling party in the elections. Consequently, there will be fewer changes in 
the electoral system in such regions. 
The last variable is the results of United Russia in the previous elections. It is 
expected that if in the previous elections United Russia won less than half of the seats in 
the regional parliament, then by the next cycle the local electoral system will undergo 
drastic changes. Conversely, if United Russia got the majority of seats in parliament, then 
the election rules will remain the same. Therefore, if United Russia won less than 50% of 




Parameter  Value 
The level of democracy (according to index value) 
0 - 40 
The number of non-Russian population (%) 
0 - 100 
The term the governor office (years) 
0 - ∞ 
The past results of the United Russia elections 
1 (<50% of seats) 
0 (>=50% of seats) 
 




2.3. Logistic regression results  
 
First cycle of the elections (2003-2007) 
As we can see from the table, there is no relationship between the level of Electoral 
Engineering and the level of democracy, the governor's term of office, the influence of 
the ethnic population in the Russian regions. These three variables did not in any way 
affect the change in the size of the assembly, the number of deputies elected under the 
proportional system, and the electoral threshold. R-squared (CoxSnell & Nagelkerke) is 
low, too, which indicates that there is no relationship between them. 
 Dependent variable: 


































R-squared (CoxSnell) 0.113 
R-squared (Nagelkerke) 0.151 
Note: 





Table 3.1. Logistic regression results for the first election cycle 
Most likely, at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's rule and the construction of a 
vertical of power in Russia, the national government set a great goal to subjugate regional 
parliaments, regardless of political sentiments and the loyalty of the elites. Thus, until 
2002, United Russia had a majority in only 40 out of 87 regions, which was the main 
reason for transforming electoral systems in the Russian regions. As a result, 77 regional 
electoral systems were changed during the first cycle of reforms; 46 of them underwent 
significant changes (more than two changes). 
It should be noted that in 54 regions, the governors ruled the areas for more than 
five years. Despite the fact that the absolute majority of the heads of the regions were in 
power, this could not affect the massive transformation of electoral systems. 
Variable Value 
Total number of regions 87 
The number of regions with a strong transformation of the 
electoral system (two or more reforms) 
46 
The number of regions with a weak transformation of the 
electoral system (no reforms or one) 
41 
Number of regions where UR had a majority in parliaments 40 
The number of regions where UR did not have a majority in 
parliaments 
47 
The number of regions where the non-Russian population is a 
minority 
73 
The number of regions where the non-Russian population is 
the majority 
14 
The number of regions where the governor ruled for more than 
5 years 
54 
The number of regions where the governor ruled for less than 
5 years 
33 
Average level of democracy in Russian regions 29,6% 
Number of regions with a high level of democracy 34 
46 
 
Number of regions with a low level of democracy 53 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of the first reform cycle 
At the same time, there is reason to believe that there is a strong relationship 
between the results of United Russia in the last elections and Electoral Engineering at the 
regional level. About this, we are told by p-Value what is less than 0.05 (p<0.05). 
Moreover, with the decrease results of United Russia, the odds in electoral system 
transformation increase almost four times (3,8) which suggests that the results of United 
Russia in the past elections were a crucial factor in changing the electoral systems of 
Russian regions. 
If we look at the results of the regression analysis, where specific parameters of 
electoral engineering are dependent variables, we will see that the strongest connection is 
the correlation between the results of United Russia in the past elections and the deputies 
elected according to the proportional system. This is confirmed by the P-value, which is 
less than 0.05 and the odds ratio is 3.2, which means that if United Russia does not gain 
more than 50% of the votes in regional elections during the elections, then the probability 
of a decrease in the number of elected deputies according to the proportional system 
increases 3.2 times. 
An interesting fact is that there is an relationship between the variables of the non-
Russian population and the size of the parliament. The p-value is less than 0.01. The more 
non-Russian population lives in the region, the more likely it is that the size of the 
parliament in the region will decrease. It is beneficial for United Russia to reduce the 
number of parliamentarians as for a large party. 
 Dependent variables: 
Parliament 
size 
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ratio 
Deputies elected 


















United Russia past 
results 








1.153**                                                                           
(0.572) 
3.168 
The level of 
democracy 










































-1.695                                    
(1.626) 




87 87 87 
R-squared 
(CoxSnell) 
0.126 0.074 0.063 
R-squared  
(Nagelkerke) 
0.259 0.100 0.097 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 3.3. Logistic regression results for the first election cycle 
Concluding the analysis of the first cycle, it must be said that the results of United 
Russia in the past elections had a significant impact on the change in electoral systems in 
the Russian regions. This variable influenced both the general electoral engineering index 
and specific parameters, for example, the Deputies elected according to the proportional 
system.  
It is important to understand that at the beginning of the 21st century, the 
presidential administration and the national government began to squeeze out the "vertical 
of power" rapidly and subordinate the regional parliaments to the Kremlin. And for this, 
it was necessary to ensure the victory of the presidential party. Thus, in the second cycle, 




Second cycle of the elections (2008-2013) 
In the second round of elections in the Russian regions, we see that the situation 
is slightly different from the previous one. This time, also, the non-Russian population 
does not affect the transformation of electoral systems, and to this list were added the 
results of United Russia last elections and the level of democracy, which also do not have 
a dependence on electoral engineering. 
 Dependent variable: 









































Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4.1. Logistic regression results for the second election cycle 
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By the second cycle of electoral reforms, we see that United Russia received a 
majority in 54 Russian regional parliaments. This means that the federal government has 
achieved its goal in just five years of reforms. However, even though United Russia had 
legislative power in many regions, the rules for holding elections were actively changed 
in this cycle. For example, in 58 areas, two or three reforms took place, the most popular 
of which is a decrease in the number of deputies elected according to a proportional 
system (60 regions) and an increase in the electoral threshold of more than 5% (74 areas). 
Variable Value 
Total number of regions 83 
The number of regions with a strong transformation of the 
electoral system (two or more reforms) 
58 
The number of regions with a weak transformation of the 
electoral system (no reforms or one) 
25 
Number of regions where UR had a majority in parliaments 54 
The number of regions where UR did not have a majority in 
parliaments 
29 
The number of regions where the non-Russian population is a 
minority 
69 
The number of regions where the non-Russian population is 
the majority 
14 
The number of regions where the governor ruled for more than 
5 years 
36 
The number of regions where the governor ruled for less than 
5 years 
47 
Average level of democracy in Russian regions 30,2% 
Number of regions with a high level of democracy 36 
Number of regions with a low level of democracy 47 
 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics of the second reform cycle 
Unlike the first cycle of reforms, from 2008 to 2013, the term of governorship 
influenced the change in electoral systems. It is worth noting that during the second cycle, 
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there is a strong correlation between the governor's term and the change in electoral rules; 
P-value is less than 0.05 (P-value<0.05). I assumed that the long reign of the governor 
would not in any way affect the transformation of the electoral system. Moreover, one of 
the hypotheses of this study said that there is minimal electoral transformation before 
elections in regions where a governor has ruled for a long time.  However, the analysis 
results show us that if the governor has been in power for many years, the probability that 
there will be changes in the election rules in the region is high (1.2). An interesting fact 
is that there were 36 such governors, and in these 30 regions, there have been significant 
changes in the electoral systems. It means that during the second cycle of reforms, 
regional governors took a significant part in transforming the electoral system of the 
regions. Most likely, this was influenced by the fact that the gubernatorial elections were 
canceled when the head of the region was no longer elected by citizens and began to be 
appointed directly by the president of Russia. To show loyalty to the Kremlin, the 
governor had to ensure the ruling party's victory, and for this, the rules for holding 
elections in the regions were probably changed. 
At the same time, if we look at the regression analysis results of independent 
variables and individual parameters of electoral engineering, we will see that there are 
not many correlations between them. There is only one significant relationship between 
the governor's term and the electoral threshold. The regression analysis results tell us that 
the head of the region rules, the more the probability that the electoral threshold in the 
province will be higher than 5%. High electrical thresholds are beneficial for large parties 
such as United Russia. And this cycle again confirms the fact that the governors were 
strong players who participated in the transformation of electoral systems in favor of the 
Kremlin. 
There is a weak relationship between the Electoral threshold and United Russia 
past results, as well as Electoral threshold and Non-Russian population. However, it is 
still impossible to conclude that there is a pattern between these variables within the 
framework of this study. 
 Dependent variable: 
Parliament 
size 
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83 83 83 
R-squared 
(CoxSnell) 
0.079 0.188 0.079 
R-squared  
(Nagelkerke) 
0.168 0.380 0.114 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4.3. Logistic regression results for the second election cycle 
In general, the second cycle of electoral reforms coincides with the first (after the 
90s and 00s) mass protests in Russia in 2011-2012. The protests were caused by the 
discontent of the population of rigging during the presidential and parliamentary elections 
(Robertson 2013). To prevent a massive number of uprisings, the national government 
decided to implement a number of electoral reforms, including at the regional level. 
Moreover, in this cycle, there is reason to believe that the national government used the 
power of the governors to carry out reforms. The results of the analysis show that in 
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regions where the governor has been in power for many years, the likelihood of an 
electoral reform increases. The national government, regional governors, and United 
Russia continue to create institutions and rules to ensure the victory of the ruling party. 
Thus, by the third election cycle, the hegemony of the pro-presidential party will 
absolutely strengthen in the Russian establishment. I came to these conclusions as a result 
of the analysis of the next cycle. 
Third cycle of the elections (2014-2018) 
The results of the analysis show that independent variables do not have a 
significant impact on changes in electoral systems in Russian regions, namely the level 
of democracy in the region, the number of non-Russian population in the region, the term 
the governor office, the past results of the United Russia elections. However, the ruling 
party did not need the transformation of electoral systems by the third cycle as a whole, 
since by this period, United Russia had won a majority in local parliaments in 80 and 83 
regions. This means that, in fact, the conditions that were created during the 1st and 2nd 
cycles contributed to the achievement of the goal of the United Russia of control of 
regional parliaments. 
 Dependent variable: 



























   











Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 5.1. Logistic regression results for the third election cycle 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that significant electoral changes (two or more) 
occurred only in 17 regions in the third cycle, making it difficult to determine what factors 
influenced the transformation of electoral engineering due to the lack of a statistically 
significant number of variables.  
 





Total number of regions 83 
The number of regions with a strong transformation of the 
electoral system (two or more reforms) 
17 
The number of regions with a weak transformation of the 
electoral system (no reforms or one) 
66 
Number of regions where UR had a majority in parliaments 80 
The number of regions where UR did not have a majority in 
parliaments 
3 
The number of regions where the non-Russian population is a 
minority 
69 
The number of regions where the non-Russian population is 
the majority 
14 
The number of regions where the governor ruled for more than 
5 years 
45 
The number of regions where the governor ruled for less than 
5 years 
38 
Average level of democracy in Russian regions 30,1% 
Number of regions with a high level of democracy 36 
Number of regions with a low level of democracy 47 
 
Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics of the third reform cycle 
By the third cycle, the national government has absolutely achieved its goal and 
received an electoral majority in almost all regional parliaments. Changes in electoral 
systems during this period of time were minimal, so it is difficult to find reasons for their 
transformation. By 2014-2018, a system had been established that promoted the ruling 
party to win elections without fraud legitimately. 
Despite the fact that there are no correlations between the general electoral 
engineering of the regions and the independent variables, we can notice the relationship 
between the EE components with them. For example, it is worth noting that there is a 
strong inverse relationship between the non-Russian population and deputies elected 
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according to the proportional system. The p-value is less than 0.01, and the odds ratio is 
0.96. It allows me to conclude that if the majority of the population in the region is 
Russian, then the likelihood that more than half of the deputies in parliament will not be 
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4.684**                                                                           
(2.131) 
Observations 83 83 83 
R-squared  
(CoxSnell) 
0.024 0.043 0.202 
R-squared  
(Nagelkerke) 
0.045 0.074 0.317 
Note: 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table 5.3. Logistic regression results for the third election cycle 
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By the third round of elections, United Russia won a party majority in all regions 
except three districts. Significant changes in the electoral system took place only in 17 
areas. By this time, there is no reason to change the rules for holding elections since the 
legislative power of the Russian regions has become controlled by the national 
government. Factors such as the results of United Russia in the last elections, the level of 
democracy, the non-Russian population, and the rule of governors did not significantly 
impact the overall transformation of electoral systems in the regions. At the same time, 
some of them, for example, the non-Russian population have a relationship to such 
parameters of Electoral Engineering as Deputies elected according to the proportional 
system. By this cycle, the ruling party has become the leading political force in the 
legislative branch at both the national and regional levels. 
Conclusion to the empirical part of the research 
For 15 years, United Russia has transformed from a minority party into a political 
force that controls national and regional parliaments. During this time, the party was able 
to subjugate almost all regions of the Russian Federation (legislative and executive 
powers), strengthening the position of the national government. In the empirical part of 
the study, I made an attempt to determine the factors that allowed United Russia to 
become the only real force in the political arena in the Russian regions. 
During the first cycle of regional elections, the main reason for the change in 
electoral systems was the past results of the United Russia elections. In regions where the 
ruling party received less than 50% of the vote, the probability of a transformation of the 
rules for holding elections increased. Moreover, this is especially pronounced in the 
parameter "Deputies elected according to the proportional system". As it is known, 
disproportionate systems are beneficial for large batches. And in regions where United 
Russia did not receive a majority, the number of deputies who can be elected from party 
lists decreased. The logistic regression results tell us that in the first cycle of electoral 
reforms, the main reason for the transformation of electoral systems in the region is the 
receipt of a minority in parliament by United Russia. 
During the second cycle, the situation changed. At this time, it is worth noting that 
as a result of the analysis, I was able to find a relationship between the term of the 
governor's office and changes in Electoral Engineering. During the second cycle, if the 
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governor has been in power for many years than, the electoral system's likelihood of 
transformation increases. It means that the heads of the region and had a significant 
impact on the changes in the electoral rules. The heads of the regions played an important 
role in the transformation of the electoral threshold - the results of the analysis tell us 
about this. 
By the third cycle, United Russia received most seats in regional parliaments in 
almost all regions. Thus, the national government achieved its goal and no longer needed 
major electoral systems that would help the government win local elections. At the same 
time, several patterns have occurred in this cycle as well. For example, in regions where 
the Russian population dominates, disproportional electoral systems prevailed (the 
number of deputies who can be elected according to the proportional system decreased). 
Thus, we see that in different cycles of regional reforms, the factors that stimulated 
changes in electoral systems differ. In the first cycle, these were essentially the past results 
of the ruling party. In the second round, it was the term of governors' rule; in the third 
cycle, there were no significant changes in the electoral systems, and the level of 






The 2002 electoral reform transformed the electoral systems of the regions and 
the political environment in Russia. All regions in the period from 2003 to 2018 changed 
the electoral rules to facilitate the collection of a large number of votes for large parties. 
Based on the listed areas of scientific literature and using rational choice 
institutionalism as a theoretical basis, groups of actors were identified that could influence 
the transformation of regional electoral systems, as well as their motives were modeled 
regarding the direction of changes in electoral institutions. Among these actors were 
identified: the national government, heads of regions and the party "United Russia". All 
these actors, through electoral engineering, could pursue the goal of creating favorable 
conditions for United Russia to obtain maximum parliamentary representation based on 
the results of regional elections. But, at the same time, their possible actions in this 
direction could depend on institutional constraints. 
In the paper, four hypotheses were put forward concerning the connection of the 
above-mentioned actors with the logic of electoral engineering at the regional level. 
Hypothesis testing was carried out using logistic regression applied separately to each of 
the three rounds of regional parliamentary elections. This approach made it possible to 
trace the trends of electoral engineering, taking into account the factor associated with the 
imposition of the political process at the country level as a whole on regional election 
campaigns within each of the cycles. 
The results of the United Russia party in the elections in the Russian regions up 
to 2003 strongly influenced the transformation of electoral systems into local parliaments. 
It is demonstrated by the results of the analysis for the first electoral cycle. At the same 
time, neither the level of democracy in the region, nor the proportion of ethnic groups 
contributes to changing the rules for holding elections. 
In the second cycle of regional elections, governors played a unique role in 
transforming electoral systems. In particular, we found out that the more years the 
governor has been in power, the more likely it is that electoral reforms will take place in 
the region. Thus, the head of the region ensures high results for the ruling party, proving 
his loyalty to National Government. As before, the presence of ethnic groups did not 
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affect the changes in electoral systems. Also, the results of the United Russia party in the 
last elections and the level of democracy did not affect the transformation of the election 
rules. 
In the third cycle, I did not find a significant relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. In general, it should be said that cardinal reforms were not 
needed by the third cycle of electoral elections. By 2014, United Russia had secured a 
parliamentary majority in 80 of Russia's 83 regions. Moreover, according to the analysis, 
only 17 regions underwent a significant transformation, making it difficult to draw 
statistically significant conclusions due to the small number of variables. 
The conclusions of the dissertation research contribute to understanding the logic 
of the transformation of electoral systems in regimes of electoral authoritarianism. In the 
course of the study, electoral engineering was analyzed in terms of individual components 
of electoral systems and at the level of the electoral system as a whole, for which a level 
was designed that reflects the level of electoral engineering in Russian regions. Based on 
the statistical analysis, it was concluded that, under certain conditions, electoral 
engineering could be important even in non-democratic regimes, where elections do not 
serve as a mechanism for the change of power but serve incumbents' purposes 
maintaining their positions of power. 
The findings of the research obtained are of scientific significance since most of 
the other studies on the topic of electoral engineering in autocracies, being carried out 
mainly within the framework of the case study strategy, were descriptive and were not 
focused on proposing hypotheses for cross-national research projects that would be 
devoted to logic transformation of the rules for holding elections in political regimes of 
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87 83 83 
R-squared (CoxSnell) 0.013 0.091 0.044 





Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
67 
 
Appendix 2  
Logistic regression results for all election cycle. DVs are Electoral Engineering components 
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87 87 87 83 83 83 83 83 83 
R-squared  
(CoxSnell) 
0.126 0.074 0.063 0.079 0.188 0.079 0.024 0.043 0.202 
R-squared  
(Nagelkerke) 
0.259 0.100 0.097 0.168 0.380 0.114 0.045 0.074 0.317 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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